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BARGAINING AND THE DETERMINANTS
OF TEACHER SALARIES
TODD EASTON*
This study examines the impact of collective bargainitig on salary
setting in public school districts. Using a 1969-82 sample of Oregon
school districts, the author focuses particularly on the roles of two
factors before and after the introduction of collective bargaining: salary
comparisons between school districts and school districts' ability and
willingness to pay for education. No evidence is found that ability and
willingness to pay influenced salary setting either before or after
collective bargaining began, suggesting that bargaining does not serve to
widen the gap in educational opportunity between wealthy and poor
districts. On the other hand, inter-district salary comparisons signifi-
cantly influenced salary setting throughout the period, but bargaining
had little effect on the influence of that factor.
IN response to increases in public sectoremployment and rapid growth in public
sector collective bargaining, economists in
the 1980s have paid more and more
attention to public employee salary deter-
mination. Public school teachers must he
counted among the most important groups
of public employees to study: 13 percent
of public employees in 1980 were teach-
ers, and 60 to 70 percent of those teachers
were working under collectively bargained
contracts in the early 1980s.i Teacher
* The author is Assistant Professor of Business
Administration at the University of Portland. He
thanks Clair Brown and David Stern for suggestions
that substantially strengthened this paper. For their
cooperation in providing data or interviews, he also
thanks employees of the State of Oregon, especially
in the Department of Education; employees and
members of the Oregon Education Association;
employees of the Oregon School Board's Association;
and school administrators from various school
districts.
' No direct counts of teachers working under
collectively bargained contracts are available. There-
fore, this percentage is an estimate, using assump-
tions suggested by Will Myers, manager of the
salary determination has received consid-
erable attention, but most research has
focused narrowly on estimating the salary
differential between bargaining and non-
bargaining school districts.^
The question addressed by this study is,
rather, whether the impact of bargaining
has differed as a function of the character-
istics of the school districts involved. Eor
example, does a school district's ability and
willingness to pay for education have a
bigger effect on salary setting in the
presence of collective bargaining or in its
absence? If collective bargaining amplifies
the importance of ability and willingness
to pay, then its presence will tend to
exaggerate the differences between wealthy
and poor districts in teachers' salaries—
Economics and Collective Bargaining Department of
the National Education Association. The estimate is
consistent with the proportion of teachers bargaining
in a large, national sample of school districts under
contract in 1977: 60 percent (Woodbury 1985:203).
^ For a recent review of these studies, see Lipsky
(1982).
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The approach I take is to compare the
determinants of district salary levels be-
fore and after legalized collective bargain-
ing. The methodology is noteworthy in
two respects. Eirst, the study follows a
sample of Oregon school districts between
1969 and 1982. The length of that period
gives one the potential to link changes in
institutional environment to changes in
bargaining outcomes, as well as to exam-
ine the stability of the salary setting
process. Second, the study examines the
determination of salaries, class sizes, and
total current school expenditures in a
simultaneous framework, allowing a close
examination of the relationships among
these three variables. For example, the
simultaneous framework allows a more
discriminating look at the relationship
between spending levels and salaries than
studies in which a single variable measures
district willingness to spend on education.
Hypotheses
Although this study examines a number
of possible effects bargaining might have
on salary setting, two particular hypothe-
ses structure the approach used. Specifi-
cally, two factors are expected to have
played an increased role in the salary
determination process once legalized col-
lective bargaining became established: (1)
comparisons to teacher salaries in differ-
ent districts; and (2) school district wealth
and other determinants of ability and
willingness to pay.
Salary Comparisons
Both prior research (Gerwin 1973) and
interviews with school district administra-
tors suggest that administrators used com-
parisons between their district and others
as an important part of the salary determi-
nation process even before collective bar-
gaining began. Administrators have access
to information about salary levels in other
districts, often compiled by a statewide
school board association. School boards
and administrators generally wish to match
Since apparently "district management"
(a phrase used here to refer to the school
board and district administrators as a
group) pays attention to salaries else-
where, one might expect salary compari-
sons to play an important role in salary
setting both before and after the advent of
legalized collective bargaining. It seems
likely, though, that bargaining would
increase the importance of comparisons,
since bargaining adds comparisons made
by other groups—including the union, the
public, and fact-finders—to those made by
administrators.
Within a teachers' union, the member-
ship will likely evaluate a negotiated
contract by comparing it with contracts
negotiated elsewhere. As Arthur Ross put
it, comparisons "establish the dividing line
between a square deal and a raw deal"
(1948:51). In Oregon, those involved in
bargaining report that both sides tend to
use neighboring districts, such as districts
in the same football league, as a yardstick.
Bargainers in large districts, on the other
hand, sometimes make comparisons within
a broader orbit, comparing their district to
a sample of large districts around the
state.
When bargaining approaches a dead-
lock, comparisons may become even more
important. To win concessions at the
bargaining table, public employee unions
not only may threaten to strike (a legal
recourse for Oregon teachers) but may
exert political pressure (Wellington and
Winter:807-8). Teachers frequently culti-
vate public sympathy for their bargaining
position, and comparisons with other
districts are one means for gaining sup-
port.
Eurther, impasse resolution procedures
in many states call for fact-finding (or
arbitration). Salary comparisons have a
strong influence on fact-finders, an influ-
ence refiected in the concern management
groups in Oregon have had with the
impact of fact-finding on salary costs. The
Oregon School Boards Association agenda
for the 1983 legislative session included a
law recommending that "mediators and
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fact-finders should consider the current,
local economic conditions of each school
district and avoid over-emphasis on statis-
tical comparisons with other school dis-
tricts."
Ability to Pay
The second hypothesis, that the pres-
ence of collective bargaining will increase
the responsiveness of the salary determi-
nation process to the school district's
ability and willingness to pay, is based on
findings of private sector collective bargain-
ing studies. Researchers have found posi-
tive correlations between wage levels and
variables linked to a firm's "ability to pay."
For example, some studies have found
that unionized firms in industries with
high concentration ratios pay higher wages
than unionized firms in low concentration
ratio industries, suggesting that unions in
those industries have been able to win a
share of the monopoly profits earned by
such firms (see, for example, Kwoka 1983;
Mishel 1986). In the case of the public
schools, the willingness of district residents
to tax themselves (and the district's busi-
nesses) is the ultimate budget constraint
on district management. If, for example,
wealthier districts are more willing to
spend on education, perhaps an effective
teachers' union could translate that willing-
ness into higher salaries than in less
prosperous districts.
If such a pattern obtains, it should be of
interest to educational policy makers.
Even without salary disparities, wealthier
districts may have an advantage in recruit-
ing teachers, due to attractive teaching
conditions. If collective bargaining created
(or increased) salary disparities between
rich and poor districts, poor districts
would find it harder still to hire good
teachers.
Gallagher studied the interaction of
bargaining and budgeting in a sample of
133 Illinois school districts, roughly half of
which had collective bargaining, during
the 1973-74 school year. He divided the
sample into low-, medium-, and high-
wealth districts. Eor medium- and high-
wealth districts, he found higher total
spending in bargaining than in non-
bargaining districts, with the spending
difference being significantly larger in the
high-wealth districts. Spending on salaries
was significantly higher in the bargaining
districts than in the non-bargaining dis-
tricts in all three wealth categories, but
there was no significant tendency for the
salary advantage to increase with district
wealth. Since the salary budget, but not
total spending, was larger in the low-
wealth districts, teachers may have forced
some reallocation of resources in these
districts. Unfortunately, Gallagher had no
data on salary levels or class sizes, so it is
not possible to tell direcdy how allocation
decisions by districts were influenced by
bargaining.
Two outcomes define the extremes of a
continuum of ways bargaining and budget-
ing might interact. On the one hand, there
niight be salary increases with no change
in total spending, so that all the increase
would be reflected in rising class sizes or in
lower spending on items outside the
teacher salary budget. On the other hand,
salary increases could accompany spend-
ing increases, with no effect on class size
or the rest of the budget. Gallagher's study
suggests that outcomes of the first sort
occur in poorer districts and outcomes of
the second sort in richer districts. But
whether the salary increases are accompa-
nied by a redistribution of resources or an
increase in the total resources going to the
schools, there is some reason to think that
increased spending on teacher salaries
would be more likely in wealthy districts.
Bargaining could more easily cause a
redistribution of funds in high-spending
districts because such districts tend to
spend a larger proportion of their budgets
on non-basic programs, which managers
might be willing to give up in a pinch. Eor
example, in a study of 195 larger Michi-
gan school districts in the late 1960s,
Barro and Garrol found that the highest-
spending districts were the ones that spent
the largest proportion of their budgets on
educational specialists and for supplies
and equipment.
In the second outcome, higher spending
adds to salary levels, with class sizes and
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spending on other program items remain-
ing at the former level. How might such
increases in spending come about? The
theory that has been most often used to
analyze the determinants of school district
spending is the median voter model. (For
a good example of this approach see
Inman 1978.) It begins with the observa-
tion that, in an election to establish the
level of output for a single public service,
where voters have single peaked prefer-
ences and vote those preferences sin-
cerely, the output level preferred by the
median voter will defeat all other propos-
als. The model further assumes that this
output level—and the associated level of
taxation—will actually be offered to voters
in a levy election, so that the median
voter's preferences prevail. In this context
there are two major avenues by which a
teachers' union may change the election's
outcome.
Eirst, one could assume voters see a rise
in teacher salaries as a rise in the price of
educational services. If this assumption is
correct, and if voters' demand for educa-
tional services is inelastic, then the spend-
ing level preferred by voters will rise with
the rise in salary. Ehrenberg's (1973:377)
estimates of employment elasticities in
education are consistent with this out-
come. Second, the union may work to
change voters' preferences. Eor example,
Oregon teacher union locals frequently
appeal directly to the public for support
for increases in school spending.
The median voter model, then, leaves
some room for teachers to influence
school district spending. But if one adjusts
for deficiencies in the model, several other
avenues for teacher influence appear.
Most important, it seems unwarranted to
assume that the median voter's preferred
level of taxation will be offered to voters in
a levy election. School boards generally
decide what the levy offered to voters will
be, and there is no reason to expect a
direct correspondence between voter pref-
erences and school board actions, even if
one could analyze voter preferences using
a system as spare as the median voter
model.3 School board elections are multi-
dimensional, and candidates seldom have
well-defined positions on spending levels.
Moreover, as Romer and Rosenthal
point out, there is room for the organiza-
tion that sets the agenda in an election to
infiuence the outcome. Suppose voters
choose between two options, a proposed
spending level and a fall-back level that
will prevail if the proposed level is voted
down. A voter might favor the proposed
level even if it exceeds his or her most
preferred level, as long as the proposed
level is preferable to the fall-back level.
Thus, there is room for a union (or other
interest groups) to infiuence an election's
outcome by infiuencing the agenda set.
To summarize, all of the connections
discussed among the union, salary levels,
and budgeting might be infiuenced by the
ability and willingness of a district's resi-
dents to support educational spending.
Redistributing budget resources to the
salary budget would likely be easiest when
spending per pupil is highest. Demand for
educational services might well be most
price inelastic in the wealthiest, most
high-income districts. Voters in the wealth-
iest districts might be easiest to convince of
the importance of supporting higher
levels of school spending. Einally, the
"room" district management has to infiu-
ence the district's spending level (via their
control of the agenda) might be largest in
the most wealthy districts.
Context and Description
of the Study
Legalized collective bargaining and a
widespread role for teachers' unions are
relatively new in Oregon. Before the
1974-75 school year, a meet and confer
law governed public sector labor relations.
' A case study of budgeting and bargaining in
Illinois found wide differences in behavior between
school district management in roughly similar posi-
tions (Cresswell et al. 1979). Some districts actually
planned on deficit spending in order to reach the
level of salaries the board thought appropriate.
Other districts levied less than the maximum they
were entitled to, in order to maintain a safety margin
for future years.
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Although in a few districts formal negoti-
ations took place under this statute, it
generally left teachers in a weak position
with respect to school boards. In October
1973 the current public sector bargaining
law was passed. By the 1975-76 school
year, Oregon Education Association (OEA)
locals had been recognized as representing
teachers in most major districts, and labor
relations in those districts was governed by
collectively bargained contracts.
On the whole, teacher bargaining in
Oregon is probably comparable to that
occurring elsewhere. An important indica-
tor of the character of bargaining in
Oregon is the nature of the contracts
negotiated. One researcher studying a
nationwide sample of contracts found that
Oregon contracts dealt with as comprehen-
sive a range of issues as did contracts
elsewhere, except for those in big city
districts, especially those in the Northeast
(Goldschmidt).
The framework of collective bargaining
and school finance in Oregon has three
distinctive elements. First, Oregon is one
of seven states in which teachers have the
legal right to strike. Although many
teacher strikes occur outside these states,
the right to strike generally would
strengthen the union's hand since it
removes the anti-strike injunction from
management's toolbox. Second, school
finance in Oregon depends more on local
revenues than is typical for the United
States as a whole. The share of local funds
in total current expenditures averaged 37
percent in Oregon in 1979-80, twelfth
highest of all states. The national average
was 43 percent in the same year (U.S.
Department of Education 1982.74). This
predominance of local funding probably
results in larger between-district differ-
ences in ability and willingness to pay than
in most states. In this respect, Oregon
should be a good place to test whether
ability and willingness to pay affects
teacher salaries.
Third, the institutions structuring voter
approval for property tax levies in Oregon
differ from those most commonly used in
other states. In the majority of Oregon
districts, voters must approve annually the
dollar amount of the property taxes levied
to support the school district.** It therefore
seems likely that in these districts voters
have more control over spending levels
than, for example, in states where they
approve a tax rate to be levied against a
district's property tax wealth.
This study compares salary determina-
tion before collective bargaining was legal-
ized to salary determination after legaliza-
tion. The pre-bargaining period,
designated Period 1, runs from the
1969-70 school year to school year
1973-74. Period 2 includes the transition
to a collective bargaining system in which
the vast majority of districts participated,
from 1973-74 to 1977-78. Period 3
comprises the remainder of the modern
history of bargaining, from 1977-78 to
1981-82.5 Indirect evidence suggests that
the initiation of bargaining improved
salaries in Oregon over what they might
have been otherwise; Oregon teacher
salaries rose relative to the national aver-
age between 1974 and 1979, after having
fallen relative to that average between
1969 and 1974.6
The unit of analysis for this study is the
school district. The 55 districts that are
examined are all the unified districts in
the state that have been in existence
'' There are two types of taxing authority for
Oregon school districts. The "special levy" is the
temporary taxing authority referred to in the text.
The permanent taxing authority, called a "tax base,"
allows a district to levy an approved amount in
perpetuity, and to increase the amount up to 6
percent per year without voter approval. During
most of the years included in this study, nearly all
districts relied on special levies. Only 7 percent of the
districts in the sample for this study relied solely on a
tax base in the 1976-77 school year, though by
1981-82 that proportion rose to 31 percent.
^The fmal year of the study, 1981-82, was the
most recent school year for which complete data
were available when the data for this study were
collected.
^ The salary measure used is the average annual
salary of instructional staff; data reported are for the
fall of each year. Oregon salaries were about 4
percent above the national average in 1969, about 9
percent below the national average in 1974, and
varied with respect to the national average between
1978 and 1981 (U.S. Department of Education,
various years). A graph summarizing the data is
available on request from the author.
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(without boundary changes) since 1969,^
and that also had an average daily atten-
dance of over 1,600 in either 1969 or
1981, This standard of 1,600 was set to
allow some geographical diversity in the
sample (75 percent of Oregon's counties
are included) without allowing it to be
dominated by small districts, where bar-
gaining is less apt to be an adversarial
process. Twenty percent of the sample
districts lie within the Pordand metropoli-
tan area.
Data for the study were gathered by the
author from a variety of sources. Salary
data are from salary surveys assembled by
the Oregon School Boards Association.
School district revenue, spending, class
size, and enrollment data come from the
Oregon Department of Education, Socio-
economic data on school districts are from
the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census of
Population and Housing, which the Cen-
sus Bureau tabulates by school district.
Estimating Salary, Class Size,
and Expenditure Levels
The model to be estimated consists of
three equations, each of which will be
discussed in its turn. The first equation
characterizes the determination of school
expenditure levels, the second the deter-
mination of class sizes, and the third the
determination of salaries.» The model will
be estimated four times, using data from
two school years before collective bargain-
ing began (1969-70 and 1973-74) and two
school years after (1977-78 and 1981-82).
Coefficients estimated in the four years
will then be examined to seek evidence for
structural change in the forces affecting
salaries.
The expenditure equation is:
(1) EXPUP = +
' A unified school district is one that includes both
primary and secondary schools. The exclusion of
districts made up solely of primary schools or solely
of secondary schools makes educational costs more
comparable between sample districts; costs per pupil
are significantly higher in high schools.
^ The structure of the model is somewhat similar
to Chambers (1978), though the independent vari-
ables chosen differ.
Eor each district in the sample, EXPUP =
school expenditures per pupil; BASE = tax
base per pupil; FOREST = Eederal Eorest
Eees plus Common School Eund receipts,
per pupil; Y = average household income;
soc = socioeconomic characteristics of
district residents;^ PUPTCH = the pupil-
teacher ratio; and SAL = a measure of the
district's salary level, based on its salary
schedule.'0 (Eor definitions of these and
other variables, see Table 1.)
The form chosen is quite general; each
of the independent variables found to be
significant in other studies is entered in a
linear form, BASE and Y are entered to
represent wealth and income effects on
school expenditures by residents, EOREST
accounts for local revenues from
non-property tax sources; districts with
^ Both the socioeconomic variables and the average
household income variable are taken from the 1970 and
1980 Censuses, tabulated by school district. Since the
available data are restricted to 1970 and 1980, the val-
ues of these variables for the four school years exam-
ined in this study were established by interpolation.
'° SAL was computed from the salary schedule for
each district. The schedule, which consists of several
columns corresponding to different levels of educa-
tion, determines an individual teacher's salary based
on that individual's teaching experience and educa-
tion. For example, an entry level teacher with a BA
would typically advance one step down the BA
column with each year of teaching experience,
gaining a higher salary at each step. He or she could
also earn more by gaining additional education: for
example, the entry level teacher with a BA might
advance to the next higher column after completing
45 credits beyond the BA. SAL is the arithmetic
average of (a) the entry level salary for a teacher with
a BA, (b) the average of the highest and the lowest
salary in the MA column, and (c) the highest salary
attainable on the schedule (without going beyond a
BA + 120 credits or an MA -I- 60 credits). A
measure of a district's salary schedule is the single
best indicator of bargaining success, because it is the
salary schedule that is the subject of collective
bargaining. An average of three points on the
schedule was selected as a measure of the schedule
because it was relatively easy to compute and also
captured important information about the salary
opportunities open to teachers with a variety of levels
of education and experience.
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Table 1. Variable Definitions."
Variable Definition
AW One or two measures of a district's ability and willingness to pay.
BASE Tax base per pupil (true cash value of taxable property, divided by enrollment).
dENROLL T h e annual percentage rate of change of enrollment (during the prior period in the level
equations, during the current period in the change equations).
ENROLL Enrollment (average daily membership).
EXPUP Per pupil school spending on current expenses.
FOREST Per pupil measure of non—property tax revenues channeled to the school district from the
county, primarily from Federal Forest Fees. (Federal Forest Fees are a percentage of
receipts f^ rom timber sales on national forest lands within a county; 6 percent of revenues
from such sales are paid to school districts in the county on a per capita basis.)
PKIDS Proportion of residents with children.
PRATE One of two measures of a district's ability and willingness to pay: the tax rate levied to
support education (measured in mills per dollar).
PRENT Proportion of residents who rent their homes.
PROF Proportion of the labor force in the category of professional, technical, and kindred
workers.
PUPTCH Pupil-teacher ratio.
REGStNDX An index of salary levels outside of teaching for regions within the state.
SAL A measure of teacher salaries, based on the district's salary schedule.
SALDIF T h e percentage difference between SAL for the district in question and mean SAL for the
whole sample.
SDIFF T h e percentage difference between SAL for the district in question and mean SAL for a
group of comparison districts.
SIZDIF T h e percentage difference between SAL and mean SAL for districts of similar size.
SOC Socio-economic characteristics of district residents (a vector of three variables: PKIDS,
PRENT, and PROF) .
SREGDIF T h e percentage difference between SAL and mean SAL for districts in the same region.
URP One of two measures of a district's ability and willingness to pay: the difference between
predicted and actual spending per pupil (unexploited revenue potential).
Y Mean household income.
" Each variable is defined on a school district basis. For example, BASE is the mean tax base per pupil for
each district in the sample.
such revenues might be expected to spend
more than districts for which the only
source of local funding is the property tax.
SOC includes socioeconomic characteris-
tics of district residents found to influence
spending levels in other studies: the
proportion of residents who are profes-
sional, technical, and kindred workers; the
proportion of district households with
children; and the proportion of district
residents who rent. All three variables are
expected to have a positive impact on
expenditures: residents working in occu-
pations requiring substantial education,
residents with children, and renters (who
may assume that they will not pay for a
property tax increase)—are all expected to
give above-average support to educational
spending, PUPTCH and SAL are included to
account for possible simultaneity in the
expenditure determination process. That
is, decisions about a district's class size and
salary schedule may influence spending
per pupil as much as spending decisions
influence class size and salary schedule.
The class size and salary equations for
the salary determination model are:
(2) PUPTCH = bo + i ] ENROLL
-I-
+ 63V
-h 64SOC
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(3) SAL = Co + CiENROLL
+ C2Y + C3SOC
+ C4REGSINDX
+ C5EXPUP
+ "3
For each district in the sample, ENROLL =
enrollment (average daily membership);
dENROLL = average annual percentage
change in enrollments over the previous
four years; and REGSINDX = an index of
salary levels for regions within the state."
Y and SOC represent characteristics of
district residents that might influence
their educational priorities, EXPUP repre-
sents the district's budget constraint; addi-
tional dollars available may be spent on
smaller class sizes or higher salaries.
ENROLL is expected to have a positive
influence on class size; smaller schools
frequently have small classes as a result of
having few students studying specialized
subjects and smaller districts are apt to
have smaller schools. The rate of change
of enrollment (dENROLL) also appears as
an independent variable in the class size
equation, because individuals interviewed
suggested enrollment changes signifi-
cantly affect districts. Hiring in districts
that experience rapid enrollment in-
creases may lag behind enrollments, per-
haps partly because administrators wish to
avoid rapid increases in the district bud-
get. As a result, class sizes might tend to
rise in such districts. On the other hand,
declining enrollments may contribute to
smaller classes, perhaps because adminis-
trators wish to avoid layoffs.
The size of the district's enrollment
(ENROLL) may influence salary levels for
' ' Computed based on limited data, using two
regional salary surveys. From the first survey, taken
in 1974 by the Local Government Personnel Insti-
tute, secretary, registered nurse, and police salaries
were used. From the second, taken in 1980 by the
Cascade Employers Association, senior secretary and
police salaries were used. An index of salary levels
for each of seven regions was developed from these
data, combining 1974 and 1980 data. Jobs included
in the index had precise descriptions and sufficient
individuals sampled in each region. For the region
with the lowest salary (Central and Eastern Oregon),
the index has a value of 91, and for the highest-salary
region (Portland Metropolitan Area) it has a value of
114.
two reasons. Eirst, there is a well-
established tendency for larger districts
(like larger businesses) to pay higher
salaries (see, for example. Chambers 1978;
Hall and Carroll 1973). Second, the
passage of the bargaining law may
strengthen this tendency, because it was
the bargaining law that legalized strikes.
Ultimately, teachers' bargaining power in
any district rests on their ability to shut
down the schools with a strike. All else
equal, strikes are more disruptive in large
districts than in small districts because of
the greater number of strike breakers who
must be hired and placed. Teacher union
members from small districts have men-
tioned size as a factor limiting their
bargaining power.
One other variable is the salary level of
regions within the state (REGSINDX) in the
salary level equation. A measure of salary
levels outside of teaching has been an
important explanatory variable in many
studies (see, for example, Erey 1975;
Gustman and Clement 1977). Most inves-
tigators treat this variable as a measure of
teachers' opportunity wage; alternatively,
one might see it as a measure of what
school boards and community residents
see as a fair salary for teachers in the
district. One district personnel director
interviewed for this study suggested that
salaries that were too far above residents'
salary levels would hurt the district's
ability to pass levies to finance school
operations, and salaries that were too far
below those of residents would badly
damage staff morale.
Estimating Salary Changes
With few exceptions, other salary deter-
mination studies have been limited to an
examination of salary levels.'2 An impor-
tant advantage of estimating an equation
in terms of the rate of change of variables
over time, however, is that it implicitly
controls for variables omitted from the
equations estimated, at least to the extent
'^ Two exceptions should be noted: a 1973 study
by Lipsky and Drotning and an excellent 1980 study
by Baugh and Stone.
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these variables remain unchanged over
the period in question.
Equation (4) is derived by beginning
with a reduced form salary equation and
taking first differences.'^ One exogenous
variable, REGSINDX, is omitted because of
data deficiencies. Tfiree variables—EN-
ROLL, SDIFF, and AW—are added to the
equation resulting from first differences
to test specific hypotheses about the
nature of the salary setting process. The
added items give the value of the variable
in question at the beginning of the period
at hand. The remaining items give the
annual percentage change of the variable
through that period.
(4) dMSCHED = eo +
-I-
-I-
+
+ e
-I- C7ENROLL
+ egSDIFF
-I- egAW + M4
For each district in the sample, SDIFF =
the percentage difference between SAL for
the district in question and average SAL for
a group of comparison districts, and AW =
one of two different measures of a
district's ability and willingness to increase
property tax revenues per pupil.
The district enrollment variable (EN-
ROLL) is included to provide evidence
regarding the subsidiary hypothesis, men-
tioned above, that passage of the bargain-
ing law would have added most to the
bargaining power of large districts. The
SDIFF variable gives a measure of the role
that comparisons might play in salary
setting. For example, the first version of
SDIFF used, SALDIF, is the percentage
difference between the SAL of the district
in question and average SAL for the whole
" A difference equation would be a plausible
alternative to the form presented here. It would
include values for the level of the independent
variables at the beginning of each period, as well as
the change values included in Equation (4). Such an
equation was estimated, but F statistics were lower for
each period than for Equation (4) and none of the
additional variables were significant in more than
one period.
sample. If comparisons play the role
suggested, SAL'S coefficient should be
negative: an above-average value at the
beginning of a period should slow subse-
quent salary growth, whereas a below-
average value should speed growth.
Two variables are used as proxies for
ability and willingness to pay. The first
proxy, unexploited revenue potential (URP),
is the difference between the property
taxes the residents of a district might be
expected to pay, given their characteris-
tics, and what they actually pay. It is minus
one times the residual of the regression of
property tax per pupil on the exogenous
variables from Equations (1) through (3)
and the rate of change variables on the
right-hand side of Equation (4).i'* Districts
that are levying higher property taxes
than similarly situated districts will have
negative values for unexploited revenue
potential. The second measure of ability
and willingness to pay is the district's
property tax rate (PRATE). It is hypothe-
sized that district residents' willingness to
spend on schools is based importantly on a
comparison between property tax rates in
their district and the rates in other districts
in the state. If this hypothesis is true, a
district with a high property tax rate
would find it difficult to increase spend-
ing; residents would regard their rates as
already being too high.
Results
One set of results presented below
(Table 2) is for the equations estimated
simultaneously, using two stage least
squares (2SLS), with expenditure per
pupil, class size, and salary level treated as
endogenous variables. A second set of
results (Table 3) is for the same model, but
'•* The rate of change variables are included to
make the measure of unexploited revenue potential
orthogonal to the other righthand variables. One
departure was made from the construction de-
scribed; the variable measuring district revenues
from forest fees (FOREST) was replaced by the sum
of forest fee revenues and revenues from state aid.
Both of these should be perfect substitutes for local
revenues; there are no restrictions on how districts
spend revenues from either source.
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estimated in a reduced form.'s Results for
the salary change regressions are reported
in Tables 4 and 5.
The ability and willingness to pay
hypothesis fares poorly in the face of the
evidence provided here. Neither of the
salary level equations offers the slightest
indication that variables predicting spend-
ing levels also predict salary levels. In the
2SLS regressions, the coefficient of the
expenditure per pupil variable is never
significant, except in 1981, when it is
negative—higher spending levels were
associated with lower salary schedules in
that year. These results are supported in
the reduced form-level regressions: vari-
ables that consistently have a significant
positive correlation with spending per
pupil—tax base per pupil and rate of
change of enrollments—have no signifi-
cant positive impact on salary schedules.
In fact, in two instances there are signifi-
cant negative effects.
Neither do the salary change equations
(Tables 4-5) provide support for the
ability and willingness to pay hypothesis.
When the coefficients of the unexploited
revenue potential variable and the prop-
erty tax rate variable are significant, their
sign is opposite that predicted by the
hypothesis. These results suggest (for
Periods 2 and 3) that below-expected
spending levels or low property tax rates
at the beginning of a period lead to slower
salary growth during the period.'^
At first blush, the other major hypothe-
sis, that collective bargaining enhances the
part played by comparisons in salary
setting, seems to be supported by the
salary change regression results. Coeffi-
'^ One caution is in order regarding the level
regression results. Because the rate of change of
enrollment does not predict class size well, the SAL
equation is empirically underidentified. It would
therefore be wise to interpret the 2SLS results
cautiously and to pay considerable attention to the
reduced form equations.
"' Despite this finding, in equations predicting
change in expenditure (not presented here), coeffi-
cients for both URP and PRATE have the expected sign
in Periods 1 and 2, and are significant in Period 2.
Evidently these variables predict spending changes,
at least in Period 1, even though they do not predict
salary changes.
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Table 5. Partial Results for Salary Comparison
Variables Included in the Salary
Change Regression."
Period
Period 1,
Period 2,
Period 3,
1969-73
1973-77
1977-81
SIZDIF''
-.085
(4.32)
-.098
(3.13)
-.138
(2.86)
SREGDIF'^
-.066
(2.60)
-.098
(2.74)
-.107
(2.15)
° In each case, the variahles listed here were substi-
tuted for the corresponding variable in Table 3, Ver-
sion B.
*" A salary comparison variable computed with
school districts grouped by size.
"^  A salary comparison variable computed with
school districts grouped by region.
Note: All values statistically significant at the .10
level, one-tailed test.
dents of the salary comparison variables
are always significant, are relatively large,
and have the expected sign in each period,
suggesting that salary comparisons consis-
tently played an important role in salary
determination. Further, the size of the
coefficients increases over time. On the
other hand, the increases are not statisti-
cally significant, and they occur later than
one would expect if the advent of collec-
tive bargaining were the cause. Most of the
increase happened between Periods 2 and
3, whereas bargaining began during Pe-
riod 2. Without more information about
the development of bargaining during this
period, it seems best to regard the
regression evidence as providing sugges-
tive, but not weighty, support for the
salary comparison hypothesis.
Additional regressions, with partial re-
sults reported in Table 5, give some indi-
cation of the sort of comparisons that have
the greatest bearing on salary setting. Here
the salary comparison variable was com-
puted by grouping districts, first by size
and then according to the region of the
state in which they are located. These re-
sults suggest that size-specific comparisons
are more telling than regional compari-
sons, since the coefficient of the variable
computed with the districts grouped by size
is generally larger than the coefficient of
the regionally grouped variable.
One puzzle about the salary level regres-
sion results is the connection between the
salary comparison variables and statewide
salary dispersion. (The dispersion data are
not reported here.) In spite of the
consistent importance of the comparison
variables, there is no reduction in salary
dispersion during the study period. In
fact, salary dispersion among districts in
the sample increased by 22 percent (mea-
sured by the coefficient of variation)
between 1977 and 1981. (Between 1969
and 1973, dispersion rose somewhat, and
between 1973 and 1977 it fell somewhat.)
There are two clues as to tbe causes of
this increase in dispersion. First, the
volatility of the salary distribution in-
creased substantially from Period 1 to
Period 2, and again from Period 2 to
Period 3. By 1981 only 37 percent of the
districts were in the same quintile of the
salary distribution that they were in
during 1977.'^ Second, the increase in
dispersion between 1977 and 1981 oc-
curred mostly within the region and size
groupings of districts, rather than among
those groupings.
The fact that dispersion grew within
groups more than among them suggests
that factors other than district compari-
sons predominated in salary setting deci-
sions during the final period. One possible
contributor to increasing dispersion is
inflation. Inflation rates were somewhat
faster between 1977 and 1981 than they
were between 1973 and 1977 (10.6 per-
cent per year vs. 8.2 percent per year,
measured by the national CPI). Perhaps
the sensitivity of local unions and district
managements to this additional pressure
on money wages varied substantially among
districts. For example, if a substantial
number of districts had long contracts
without COLA clauses, and if contract
expiration dates varied within the sample,
then both volatility and dispersion might
'•^  Matthews (1982) also found evidence of a
volatile salary distribution in a sample of 67 Florida
school districts. Examining salary patterns between
1973 and 1980, he found that 30 of the districts
studied were salary leaders for their region in at least
one school year. Matthews makes no comment about
trends in volatility over the period studied.
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well have increased during an inflationary
period.
Three results of the salary equations are
noteworthy. First, as in most studies, the
most consistently significant variable is the
index of salaries outside of teaching
(described by some authors as an opportu-
nity wage for teachers,) Second, although
there is some weak evidence that salary
schedules are higher in larger districts,
there is little indication that this pattern
persists after the introduction of collective
bargaining.
Third, it appears that districts with a
higher proportion of residents renting
their homes consistently pay higher sala-
ries to teachers. This result is surprising,
since the only predicted impact of this
variable on salaries was through the
expenditure variable, and the only year in
which the proportion of renters in a
district had a positive impact on spending
was 1977 (in the reduced form results),'*
This positive connection between the
proportion of residents renting and teacher
salaries may reflect a tendency of salaries
to be higher in urban areas. (In this
sample the proportion of district residents
renting is highly correlated with the
proportion of district residents living in an
urban area.)
The most striking aspect of the class size
equations—both the 2SLS and reduced
form versions—is the important role played
by variables linked to ability and willing-
ness to pay. Further, the role played by
these variables increased over time.'^ The
increasing importance of these variables,
along with the rise in the r^ of the
equation from 1969 to 1977, suggests that
there was no tendency for teacher locals to
win salary increases at the expense of an
'*" In contrast, other studies have found a consis-
tent positive relationship between the proportion of
renters in a tax district and the district's spending
level (see, for example, Barr and Davis 1966;
Bergstrom and Goodman 1973).
'^ For example, consider the variable BASE. Even
though the coefficient of BASE falls from period to
period, the effect of this fall is more than offset by
the tremendous increase in tax base per pupil and
the substantial increase in salary levels over the study
period. The beta coefficient for BASE was - .33 in
1969 and - .68 in 1981.
increase in class size. If such a tradeoff
had been made, one would expect the link
between spending and class size to have
weakened rather than strengthened.
Two aspects of the expenditure equa-
tion results have special interest. First, the
reduced form results suggest that enroll-
ment growth had a potent impact on
spending levels (an impact that was not
anticipated when the structural model was
constructed). That is, the results suggest
that if a district experiences rapid enroll-
ment growth for four years, it tends, at the
end of that period, to spend less per pupil
than districts with slower enrollment
growth. This pattern may well result from
the way voters view tax levy proposals:
they may evaluate a levy primarily by
comparing the total request to what their
district requested in previous years. For
example, when enrollment grows rapidly
it would be difflcult to get voters to
approve the substantial levy increases
necessary to maintain spending per pupil,
whereas a district with shrinking enroll-
ment might find it relatively easy to
increase spending per pupil.
Second, there is no evidence that dis-
tricts tend to spend less on schools when
only a small proportion of residents have
children. In f'act, in the one case in which
the variable measuring the proportion of
residents with children is significant, it is
actually negative. This result might give
pause to those who blame the crisis in local
school finance on the declining proportion
of families with children.
Summary
Most research on collective bargaining
and public school teacher salary determi-
nation has estimated the size of bargain-
ing's impact on salaries. One goal of the
present study has been, instead, to investi-
gate the interaction between bargaining
and district wealth to see if bargaining
raises salaries more in wealthy districts
than in poor ones. A motivation for this
research was a concern that collective
bargaining in schools might widen salary
differences between rich and poor dis-
tricts, differences that might further un-
DETERMINANTS OF TEACHER SALARIES 277
dercut the ability of poor districts to hire
high-quality teachers. This concern ap-
pears to be groundless. Though salary
differentials between wealthy and poor
districts did widen during the study
period, this study finds no evidence that
Ijargaining affected the relationship be-
tween districts' ability and willingness to
pay and salary determination. In fact, the
results offer no indication that ability and
willingness to pay had a positive influence
on salary levels at any time either before
or after collective bargaining began.
A second goal of this study has been to
examine the effect on salary setting of
salary comparisons among school districts.
The results suggest that sucb comparisons
played an important role in salary setting
both before and after the advent of
collective bargaining, but there is no firm
indication tbat the role of comparisons
increased after collective bargaining be-
gan. The surprising finding that salaries
in the districts studied nonetheless did not
converge during the study period—and,
in fact, diverged in the years 1977-81 —
may reflect such factors as the differing
sensitivity of local unions and district
managements to inflation.
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